Aid to conflict-affected countries : lessons for donors by McGillivray, Mark & Addison, Tony
	 	
	
 
This is the published version 
 
McGillivray, Mark and Addison, Tony 2004, Aid to conflict-affected countries : 
lessons for donors, Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 
347-367. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30028869	
	
	 	
	
	
 
 
 
 
Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright: 2004, Taylor and Francis 
 
 
 
  
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
This article was downloaded by: [Deakin University]
On: 6 August 2010
Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 907464590]
Publisher Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-
41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Conflict, Security & Development
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713411970
Aid to conflict-affected countries: lessons for donors
Tony Addison; Mark McGillivray
To cite this Article Addison, Tony and McGillivray, Mark(2004) 'Aid to conflict-affected countries: lessons for donors',
Conflict, Security & Development, 4: 3, 347 — 367
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/1467880042000319926
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1467880042000319926
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Conflict, Security & Development 4:3 December 2004
Aid to conflict-affected
countries: lessons for donors
Tony Addison and Mark McGillivray
Since the end of the Cold War, there have been 58 different armed conflicts in 46
different locations. Most have been civil wars in developing countries (Eriksson et al.,
2003). These civil wars have had strong regional dimensions—notably the contest over
the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, involving neighbouring
Rwanda and Uganda—and strong international ones, especially since the 9/11 terrorist
attack on the US. There is some good news: the number of conflicts in 2002 was the
lowest since 1998 (Eriksson et al., 2003), and the conflicts in Angola and Sri Lanka
appear to be over. However, there is also bad news: Afghanistan’s democratisation is
stalling, Iraq faces a very uncertain future, and international terrorism is causing serious
human damage and economic disruption.
Aid plays a highly controversial role in conflict-affected countries—both those at war
and those attempting ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction. There is no clear understanding of
how aid might keep conflicts from breaking out or escalating, or how different types of
aid influence outcomes (Addison, 2000; Demekas et al., 2002; Picciotto, 2004). This is
a large canvas, and no one paper can address all the issues. In this paper, we focus on
some of the most urgent.
The first section looks at the implications of conflict for aid effectiveness and
selectivity. We argue that, while aid is generally effective in promoting growth and by
implication reducing poverty, it is more effective in promoting growth in post-conflict
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countries. We then consider the implications of these findings for donor selectivity
models and for assessment of donor performance in allocating development aid among
recipient countries. We argue that, while further research on aid effectiveness in
post-conflict scenarios is needed, existing selectivity models should be augmented with,
inter alia, post-conflict variables, and donors should be evaluated on the basis, inter alia,
of the share of their aid budgets allocated to countries experiencing post-conflict
episodes. We also argue for aid delivered in the form of projects to countries with weak
institutions in early post-conflict years.
The second section focuses on policies for donors operating in conflict-affected
countries. We set out five of the most important principles: (1) focus on broad-based
recovery from war; (2) to achieve a broad-based recovery, get involved before the
conflict ends; (3) focus on poverty, but avoid ‘wish lists’; (4) help to reduce insecurity
so aid can contribute more effectively to growth and poverty reduction; and (5) in
economic reform, focus on improving public expenditure management and revenue
mobilisation.
The third section concludes by emphasising the fact that there is no hard or fast
dividing line between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ and that it may take many years for a society to
become truly ‘post’-conflict’. Donors, therefore, need to prepare for the long haul.
Aid effectiveness and selectivity
In this section, we review the findings of two sets of studies, on aid, growth, and poverty
reduction and on aid allocation, selectivity, and donor performance.
Aid, growth, and poverty reduction
For nearly 30 years, research on the macroeconomic effectiveness of aid failed to
produce consensus on whether or not aid increases growth and by implication reduces
poverty. Cassen (1994) summarised the situation:
Much of the literature on the macroeconomic effects of aid deals with
relatively large groups of developing countries. Its results are ambiguous. The
relationship between aid and growth is rather weak: it can be either positive
or negative, depending on the country groupings and time period chosen.
Combined with evidence that aid tended to work well at the project level, this led to
discussion of the well-known macro-micro paradox of aid (Cassen, 1994; Mosley, 1997).
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The publication of Burnside and Dollar’s (1997, 2000) landmark study changed the
debate. Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) argued that project-level evidence was
irrelevant given the fungibility of funds and proposed an empirical aid-growth model,
built on the hypotheses that growth in aid-receiving economies depends on the level of
aid relative to GDP, the quality of the recipient’s economic policies, interaction between
the level of aid and policies, and other variables (initial GDP, ethnic fractionalisation,
institutional quality, and so on). They estimated the parameters of their model using
data for a sample of 56 countries covering the periods 1970–73 to 1990–93. They found
that aid alone did not have a statistically significant positive impact on growth, but that
aid interacting with policy did. This led the World Bank (1998) and others to conclude
that aid alone was ineffective, and that it only worked in countries with good policies.
Others were more cautious in their interpretation, noting that Burnside and Dollar’s
finding was that the impact of aid was contingent on policy—specifically that more aid,
up to a point, and better policies combine to increase growth.
The Burnside–Dollar research has spawned more than 25 econometric studies1, almost
all of which agree with its fundamental thrust: that aid is effective in promoting growth
and, by implication, in reducing poverty. In addition, a number of studies have looked
at the link between aid and indicators of the quality of life, concluding that aid is
effective in this regard as well. It seems that the macro-micro paradox is dead and buried
(McGillivray, 2003a).
These studies have failed to confirm the relevance of recipient country economic
policies for aid effectiveness. Most of them, including Roodman (2003), have challenged
the empirical robustness of the Burnside Dollar aid-policy interaction. They conclude
that aid works in promoting growth irrespective of the policy regime of the recipient
country. Some have challenged the interpretation of the aid-policy interaction.
McGillivray (2003b) notes that the interaction term can be interpreted in two equally
valid ways: in the Burnside and Dollar way, (the impact of aid on growth depends on
policy) or in the reverse, (the impact of policy on growth depends on the level of aid).
While this debate will probably rage on for some time, the heart of the disagreement is
less about the relevance of country policy than about the validation of econometric links
between policy and aid effectiveness.
There is general agreement among researchers and policymakers that better policies,
appropriately defined, should result in more effective aid (Robinson and Tarp, 2000;
Beynon, 2001, 2002; McGillivray 2003a, b). Thus, Gomanee et al. (2002) identify aid
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
1:
42
 6
 A
ug
us
t 
20
10
350 Tony Addison and Mark McGillivray
‘transmission mechanisms’: channels through which aid may raise growth. Aid can affect
growth directly, but also through its impact on investment, imports, public sector fiscal
aggregates, and government policy. Gomanee et al. (2002) tested for the presence of the
aid-investment-growth mechanism, finding strong evidence that it exists. This result led
Morrissey (2002) to suggest that government policies can play an important role in
enhancing aid effectiveness, by improving the productivity of investment. Similar
dynamics may apply with respect to the other mechanisms. For example, policies aimed
at improving the productivity of government expenditure should improve the impact of
aid on growth, provided adequate aid-fiscal linkages are forged. The aid transmission
mechanisms interpretation differs fundamentally from the relationship envisaged by
Burnside and Dollar. In the Burnside and Dollar model, aid does not affect policy; it
simply interacts with it to spur growth. The sorts of relationships identified by Gomanee
et al. (2002) may provide a key justification for relating aid allocation to vehicles that
are judiciously connected to recipient country policies.
A number of studies have analysed aid and growth using what are essentially
augmented Burnside-Dollar growth models, taking into account alternative or additional
aid-growth contingencies (Collier and Dehn, 2001; Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001;
Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Collier and Hoeffler (2002) examine the impact of aid on
growth in post-conflict scenarios.2 They note that the economic circumstances of
post-conflict countries are distinctive in many respects: the need to restore infrastructure
combined with a collapse of domestic revenue can make aid unusually productive and
growth can be supra-normal. Offsetting this, though, is what they describe as ‘persistent
high-corruption equilibrium’ (Tirole, 1992). Collier and Hoeffler empirically tested
whether aid is more effective in post-conflict scenarios by a series of augmentations to
the Burnside–Dollar aid-growth model. Their results show that aid is more effective in
promoting growth in post-conflict societies. This impact is not uniform, and is
contingent on policies in the Burnside–Dollar sense. Collier and Hoeffler find that in the
first and last three years of a post-conflict decade, aid is no more effective than it is
elsewhere, but that in the middle four to five years, aid is more than twice as effective.
During these middle years, they find that, conditional on policies, post-conflict countries
experience a growth spurt that is about two percentage points greater than during the
earlier and later years, and that this spurt does not happen in post-conflict countries
without aid. Accordingly, they recommend that donors should phase in their aid to
post-conflict countries during these middle years.
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Aid allocation, selectivity, and donor performance
Donors provide substantial amounts of aid to conflict-affected countries. In 2001, for
example, OECD members provided more than US$ 5 billion in bilateral assistance to
post-conflict countries,3 amounting to about 15% of total OECD bilateral assistance in
that year. These amounts have likely risen since then, given the situations in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
There appears to be little evidence, however, that donors systematically consider
conflict when allocating aid. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find, perhaps not surprisingly,
that countries in conflict receive less aid than they would otherwise. However, they also
find that countries in the final years of a post-conflict decade receive less aid than they
would otherwise.
These results are of great concern for poverty reduction. A clear implication of the
Burnside–Dollar research is that if aid is to be poverty-efficient, it should be allocated
to countries in which it is most effective. This is the basic premise of work by Collier
and Dollar (2001, 2002), in which poverty-efficient aid allocations are derived from a
formal aid-allocation framework. This ‘selectivity’ approach, as it has become known,
has attracted much support and some controversy in research and policy circles. Collier
and Dollar argue that aid allocations should be positively related to the perceived quality
of a country’s policies and to the numbers of people living in poverty within the country,
and negatively related to national income per capita. Thus, for two recipient countries
with identical poverty levels and per capita incomes, the difference in aid receipts would
be determined by the differences in their policy regimes. Of course, if one does not
accept that policy matters for aid effectiveness in the Burnside–Dollar sense, one could
still justify such an allocation rule by arguing that aid, or its denial, might lead to policy
reform ex post. This in turn might give rise to improved aid effectiveness, as per
Morrissey (2002).
There would appear to be a strong case for expanding the Collier–Dollar and other
donor-developed selectivity frameworks to include post-conflict variables. If aid is more
effective in promoting growth in post-conflict countries, then, other things being equal,
these countries should receive more aid than others do.
Moreover, donors should be evaluated against the shares of their aid that they allocate
to post-conflict countries. Table 1 shows the shares of aid that donors have allocated to
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Table 1. Measures of donor performance, 2001
ODADonor TiedODA to Grant Aid toMDG-Partially
targetedtoGNI element tied post-conflict
LLDCsratio countries
(Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (%)(Rank) (Rank)
Australia 14 171 14.414 1 14 17
Austria 12 14.720 1615 – – 18
Belgium 5 14 36 32.21 8 12
12.7Canada 1818 1 18 1 15 6
Denmark 1 1 1 1 5 1 8.5 20
Finland 8 1 610 25.91 9 5
France 9 18 11 18 7 19 3.4 22
Germany 13 17 1513 14.81 10 14
Greece 19 1 63.720 11 16 –
Ireland 7 1 85 21.51 – 9
Italy 20 15 16 27.31 417 13
Japan 17 21 17 15 11 11 10.7 19
Luxembourg – – 11– 19.8– – –
Netherlands 3 1 3 14 6 2 20.3 10
New Zealand 15 1 2112 7.5– – –
Norway 2 11 24.32 71 1 4
Portugal 16 16 28 57.016 13 16
Spain 11 19 19 13 12 15.915 14
Sweden 4 12 94 20.517 2 3
Switzerland 6 1 26.69 51 3 8
UK 10 1 127 18.41 4 10
US 17.021 1313 21 – – 7
DAC –– – 15.0– –– –
combined
Notes: ODA is official development assistance; GNI is gross national income; LLDCs are
least developed countries; MDG is Millennium Development Goals; DAC is the Devel-
opment Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
Sources: Compiled from data in OECD (2002, 2003a, 2003b) and Collier and Hoeffler
(2002).
post-conflict countries, together with the typical variables on which donors’ allocative
performance is assessed.
A related concern has to do with countries in conflict or in the early post-conflict
years. These countries are likely to do very poorly on assessments of policy and
institutional quality and, therefore, might be penalised by donors using existing or
augmented selectivity frameworks. Penalising such countries would be inappropriate: it
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would cause some of the poorest people in the poorest countries to be denied external
assistance, and it would do nothing to reduce the risk of a return to violent conflict.
Donor mechanisms are in already in place to work with such countries, such as the
World Bank’s ‘Low-income countries under stress (LICUS)’ programme, but these
mechanisms are arguably greatly under-funded.
How might aid be provided to countries that are still in conflict or in the early
post-conflict years, and that score poorly in terms of institutional and policy criteria?
Well-designed project support, delivered independently of the recipient country govern-
ment, may have an important role to play in these countries.4 Projects can restore badly
needed infrastructure, and can win broad-based local support for peace and reconstruc-
tion processes. There is of course an issue of recipient government ownership of such
projects, and related concerns that project outcomes might not be sustained. However,
well-designed projects can minimise the likelihood of non-sustainability; so too can a
productive dialogue between donor agencies and recipient governments. There is a ‘low
hanging fruit’ danger, discussed in the next section, but this can be avoided if projects
are well designed, well targeted, and well implemented. Projects within well functioning
ministries and local governments in otherwise malfunctioning states can be assisted
when general budgetary support is not feasible and when such government units are
effective in reaching the poor; examples of these steps are given below.
Guiding principles for donors
What policies should donors follow in countries affected by conflict? We look at some
general principles, and in the process examine the relationship that is often assumed
between aid, policy, growth, poverty and peace in these countries.
Principle 1: Focus on broad-based recovery from war
War causes immense human suffering, and broadens and deepens poverty. Ending war
saves lives, but may do little for livelihoods. Refugees and internally displaced persons
will resettle, but without human capital, infrastructure, and secure access to their assets,
they will be unable to participate fully in post-conflict recovery. In contrast, elites—in-
cluding some of those who profited from the war—can do very well in post-conflict
reconstruction, consolidating their gains and sometimes exploiting the confusion of war
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and its aftermath to seize assets from poor communities. In the worst case, warlords
control the state and rebuild its institutions to maximise their own wealth and power
(Liberia under Charles Taylor being the prime example).
Hence, reconstruction may turn out to be narrow—its benefits focused on an elite
minority—rather than broad-based, leaving many people impoverished and storing up
political trouble for the future (Addison, 2003). The strategy for post-conflict recovery
should accordingly focus on reducing absolute poverty as a primary objective. That
strategy may need to aim for reducing overall inequality as well, when high inequality—
across ethnic groups, regions, and other social divisions—has inflamed grievances and
contributed to conflict (Stewart, 2001).
Donors, therefore, need to be clear in the poverty focus of their post-conflict
assistance. Principles 2 to 4 highlight how to do this.
Principle 2: To achieve a broad-based post-conflict recovery, get
involved before the conflict ends
In many conflicts, there are opportunities to get involved in poverty-reduction projects,
rather than just providing humanitarian assistance, before a peace deal is achieved. For
instance, in Mozambique, donors supported rural-livelihood projects under the Safe
Areas scheme (those areas not affected by the war) during the latter part of that
country’s 16-year civil war. In Luanda, livelihood projects were supported during
Angola’s civil war (de Sousa et al., 2003). Such early action is crucial because securing
and building the human capital of the poor will do much to ensure that they come out
of war with at least some skills to use in the peace. For example, de Sousa (2003) found
that households in Mozambique’s Manica province who were assisted in this way had
higher incomes and better human development indicators in the immediate post-conflict
years than households who had only received humanitarian assistance. The former group
were able to use their skills to rebuild their lives more quickly than the latter.
Part of the wartime misery of poor people is due to bad policy rather than just the
exigencies of wartime economies. For example, Angola’s hyperinflation in the 1990s
inflicted an avoidable extra burden on the poor. Economic policy formulation does not
stop in wartime; it just gets harder. Donors should do as much as they can to support
pro-poor projects before a war ends, and to help governments manage public expendi-
tures, in order to improve the allocation of public money to pro-poor priorities. This
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principle implies channelling financial and technical assistance to support policy reform
before a war ends. For example, providing technical support to key ministries and the
central bank, locating and supporting pro-poor allies among the line ministries (the
health ministry was in the vanguard in Mozambique), and, if possible, providing
adjustment credits and grants to support pro-poor policy reform, or at least building the
capacity for post-conflict recovery (as in Sri Lanka).
Principle 3: Focus on poverty, but avoid ‘wish lists’
Although poverty reduction is a core priority, it depends on clearly defining priorities
and providing enough resources, both financial and human, to execute them. Many
post-conflict recovery strategies get swamped by too many priorities that are poorly
conceived and have little chance of implementation. Resources end up spread too thinly
a lot of badly designed initiatives start and then run out of resources, and the entire
agenda ends up in a giant ‘wish list’. More resource mobilisation (external resources,
such as aid and debt relief, and internal revenues) is of course crucial, and if resources
can be found then the tradeoffs between goals can be relaxed somewhat. Yet the
difficulties of setting priorities almost never disappear entirely.
Countries and donors that stick with a wish list tend to grab the ‘lowest-hanging
fruit’, implementing what is easiest rather than what has the highest priority for poverty
reduction. This has two effects. First, the areas with the worst poverty, in incidence
and/or intensity, may simply get left out. These areas often received little assistance
before the war; because both their environment and location are tough or because their
people are politically disadvantaged, (in which case they may have been active as rebels).
Second, the wish list draws attention away from the key constraints on poverty reduction
at a time when something could be done about them. The central issue here is the weak
property rights of the poor and their communities with respect to land and other natural
capital such as forests or fisheries. The chaos of large-scale population displacement and
resettlement is compounded by often badly designed and anti-poor policies on land
tenure (for example, the socialist-era nationalisation of common property resources in
Africa). Powerful commercial interests sometimes allied to people with political power
in the post-conflict government, then manoeuvre to secure the best assets, whose value
rises sharply with peace (agricultural land close to infrastructure, urban real estate, and
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coastal areas with tourist potential). This is now happening in Angola, as it did in
Mozambique in 1994–96 (Addison 2003; Wuyts 2003).
Hence, post-war economic growth delivers more benefits to people with productive
assets (the wealthy) than to those without (the poor). Early action to secure and build
the assets of the poor will raise the growth-elasticity of poverty reduction in the post-war
period, and is, therefore, an urgent priority.
Principle 4: Help to reduce insecurity so aid can contribute more
effectively to growth and poverty reduction
Within the donor community, an often-heard story goes like this: if a post-war
government can implement a set of ‘good’ economic policies, then these will promote
growth. Growth will reduce poverty, depending on the poverty elasticity of growth,
and—through improving livelihoods—will secure peace, by reducing everyone’s incen-
tive to fight now that they can happily make a peaceful living. Hence, insofar as aid flows
increase a government’s incentive towards good policy, aid promotes peace. We call this
the aid-policy-growth-poverty-peace (A → P → G → P → P) story. We alluded to this
idea above when we emphasised broad-based recovery as a principle, and the evidence
on growth was discussed earlier.
The nice thing about this story is that one instrument—good policy—achieves three
different outcomes: growth, poverty reduction, and peace. Behind that good policy is
aid—so aid achieves three different, good things. If this story is true, donors could get
a lot more from aid to conflict-affected countries than from aid to peaceful countries,
and might want to let that differential influence their aid allocation across countries, as
discussed above.
Like all good stories, this one takes hold of the imagination because it has a kernel
of truth, or rather three kernels. First, we can list bad policies that harm growth, and
while our individual lists might differ somewhat, there is consensus (among economists
at least) about what countries should not do: overvalue the currency, thereby undermin-
ing the production of tradables; tax agriculture to the point at which real producer
incentives decline over time; finance the fiscal deficit with a level of monetary expansion
that generates hyperinflation, and so forth. Second, by achieving growth, whether
through policy reform or something else, a country effectively enlarges the social pie.
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Competition for that social pie does not have the same level of desperation, and
potential for violence, as competition for a stagnant or shrinking pie (such as the
negative growth of sub-Saharan Africa over much of the last 30 years). Growth offers
better prospects for win-win politics, rather than the ‘You win therefore I lose’ politics
that too often accompany falling GDP, and that eventually fracture institutions of
conflict-containment (as for example in Coˆte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone in the 1990s and
Nepal today). Third, when growth reduces poverty, people are less drawn to make a
living by fighting. It dulls, though it does not eliminate, the persuasiveness of the
recruiting-sergeants who roam among Africa and Asia’s young unemployed. Much
evidence shows this to be the case (Gates, 2001).
In practice, however, the aid-policy-growth-poverty-peace story is a bit too good to
be true. Do we really believe that we can hit three targets, or four if we include policy
reform itself, with one instrument? It is not impossible, but there are some major issues
along the way.
Aid to policy reform (a→ p) in conflict-affected
countries
The story about aid to policy reform is an old one, so we will not repeat what has been
said before. In conflict-affected countries, it gets some important twists. First, good
policy can only be made by functioning institutions. Some conflict-affected countries,
such as Mozambique and Sri Lanka, have surprisingly robust institutions that formulate
good policies when politicians give them a chance to do so. Even Angola and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo have some fine macroeconomic technicians. How-
ever, Afghanistan does not, and new countries—Timor Leste, Eritrea in 1993—need to
build those institutions. With no institutions, there is little chance of any, let alone good,
policymaking.
Second, in some cases, donors or foreign authorities themselves are effectively the
government, as in Kosovo, or with the UN transitional administration in pre-indepen-
dence East Timor, and the US and British authorities in Iraq. Lack of ‘ownership’ of
policy reform, much discussed in the literature, is not an issue in these cases.
Third, donors can convince themselves that it is good policy that determines whether
they should start (or continue) to give money to a conflict-affected country. What really
drives such decisions is often some larger geopolitical concern of the donor country, in
which the aid agency is very much the junior partner to the foreign ministry and the
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military. Post-Taliban Afghanistan holds out the promise of implementing good policy
(once the institutions get built, and if luck holds), but it cannot be a candidate for aid
on the basis of past policy performance, which was abysmal under the Taliban. The same
holds for post-Taylor Liberia, which must be helped on the basis of a judgement-call
about the likely effectiveness of the new government, rather than anything Taylor and
his cronies did. Post-conflict aid programmes can have a momentum of their own,
which is often supply-driven. This is very much evident in post-war Mozambique, where
all the big donors have invested to establish themselves in the country for the long haul.
Fourth, the discount rate of domestic political actors may be so high that they have
little incentive to reform policy. If, for example, public sector restructuring requires
massive, politically explosive reductions in the civil service, the discount rate will be
high. This is a problem in inducing any policy reform, but it is particularly severe in
conflict-affected societies because conflict drives up private discount rates to very high
levels that can persist well into the post-war years. The present modus operandi of the
international community, whereby aid operations are begun without sufficient military
force to contain spoilers, keeps the discount rates of all actors—the state, the private
sector, and communities—high. When a country has gone through a succession of wars,
and peace deals that have been reneged on by one or all of the parties, a serious
credibility problem generates uncertainty for all actors (Addison and Murshed, 2002).
Afghanistan is a prime example of these difficulties.
Finally, asymmetric information is always a problem between donors and recipients,
but it has a particular twist in conflict-affected countries. Locals usually know much
better than internationals what will tip the balance of domestic politics towards
peace-building coalitions or back towards political fragmentation and war. The locals
may favour policies that are anti-growth (and indeed anti-poverty reduction) but that
they feel promote peace. Two examples can be given. First, in power-sharing govern-
ments comprising former belligerents, each party will seek to pack the ministries under
its control with its own supporters, in order to build its power base and buy loyalty
through salaries and patronage opportunities. The result will be a sclerotic and expensive
public administration that nevertheless gives a large number of former—and still
potential—belligerents a financial stake in sticking with peace. Post-war Cambodia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina both reveal this dynamic to some degree. Second, the central
government may be reluctant to step up revenue collection if doing so threatens the
personal income of powerful political actors—who derive revenues either from their
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control of lucrative natural resources or from their ability to tax local trade and
commerce. For instance, the ability of Afghanistan’s administration to take control over
the country’s customs revenues is impeded by warlords who impose their own local
taxes.
Policy reform to growth (p→ g) in
conflict-affected countries
Removing market distortions in key productive sectors holds out the promise of raising
growth. In many conflict-affected countries, state market controls collapsed during the
war. Still, the injection of foreign aid relaxes rationing in goods markets, and thereby
eases the supply of inputs and capital equipment for producers. Insofar as reconstruction
gets infrastructure back into operation—by de-mining key rural roads, for instance—aid
allows producers to respond more effectively to any improvement in price incentives.
Going beyond the direct immediate post-war rehabilitation efforts of international actors
(NGOs, the military) requires public expenditure reform to make infrastructure spend-
ing a continuing priority.
Continuing high insecurity can thwart policy reforms. High discount rates play an
important role in distorting the incentives of political actors, as mentioned above, but
their effects are not confined to the political sphere. They also reduce investment in
private-sector projects that have immediate costs and delayed returns. These are typically
long-term investments in the production sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture.
Their fixed-asset content makes the owner vulnerable to predation, losing the asset to
looting before any return is generated. This cuts the expected profitability of the
investment, which is further reduced by a high discount rate that lowers the net present
value of the future profit stream. The disincentive to invest is further compounded by
the effects of conflict on the domestic financial system: producers either face rationing,
which locks all but the safest borrowers out of the credit market, or high interest rates,
as lenders add large premiums to loan rates in an effort to reduce their risk (Addison
et al., 2004). Again, investors in production sectors tend to fare the worst: lenders’
perception of the risks of default discourages them from lending for long-term
investments.
All of this favours investment in sectors where the returns are immediate and involve
little investment in fixed assets. Commerce is the best investment in this regard. Hence,
conflict-affected countries are characterised by a great deal of selling and reselling of
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scarce goods and trading in foreign exchange. While it is true that peace reduces or
eliminates wartime rationing, the relative incentive to invest in commerce over pro-
duction can still favour the former because of continuing high insecurity.
Such uncertainty discourages the production of tradables (exportables or importables)
in conflict-affected developing economies.5 Thus, an economy may significantly adjust
the real exchange rate and yet see little output response from the tradable sectors.
Furthermore, some conflict-affected countries experience a decline in the competitive-
ness of their exports, due to international developments unrelated to the conflict. This
means that their leading pre-war sector may not have the same potential post-war.
Meanwhile, during the conflict they may develop an international comparative advan-
tage in a good or service, such as narcotics, that international donors wish to discourage.
This leaves the economy dependent upon foreign aid for its legitimate foreign exchange.
Afghanistan’s shift from cotton to opium production during its wars and the inter-
national community’s struggle to reintroduce cotton farming, exemplifies this trend.
Weakness in the international cotton market—due to the rise of other developing-coun-
try exporters but also to large US subsidies to domestic cotton production—together
with a strong global heroin market, shifted Afghanistan’s terms of trade against cotton
and in favour of opium. Donor projects to wean farmers away from opium production
will struggle in the face of this terms-of-trade shift, and the Afghan economy will need
large inflows of aid for the foreseeable future. It is often said that trade is the other side
of the aid coin, and this is even more the case in conflict-affected countries, which
remain highly aid-dependent (and highly indebted) until they can achieve sustained
trade-led development. The protectionism practiced by the rich world diminishes
aid-effectiveness in conflict-affected countries, and indeed undermines the international
security agenda.
Growth to poverty reduction (g→ p) in conflict
affected countries
The extent to which GDP growth reduces poverty is a matter of debate. It is not our
purpose to review the debate here (see instead Van der Hoeven and Shorrocks, 2003).
We instead note three twists in the growth-poverty argument for conflict-affected
countries.
First, it follows that the constraints that high insecurity imposes on investment in
tradable sectors present a problem for poverty reduction through growth. One of the
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sectors that suffer most is agriculture, which provides the main livelihood for many poor
people. Thus, continuing post-conflict insecurity will reduce the ex post return from
donor projects in rural areas. Large amounts of food aid will continue to be needed.
Second, much of the mining sector typically has the weakest links to the rest of the
economy, and therefore the smallest employment-multiplier effects. (Angola, where the
oil sector constitutes an offshore enclave, is an acute case; in contrast, alluvial diamonds
in Angola and Sierra Leone generate more direct employment.) Achieving poverty
reduction through growth in these sectors therefore depends on pro-poor public
spending of revenues. This in turn depends on having an effective public expenditure
management system—a tall order in most conflict-affected countries (see principle 4
below).
Third, resource-poor regions need to receive priority in infrastructure and human
capital spending, or growth will be very unevenly spread. A high national growth rate
can disguise considerable regional variation in per capita income. For instance, Mozam-
bique’s national growth rate since the end of its civil war has been impressive, often
exceeding 8 percent a year, but some regions have stagnated. Many of these are regions
that gave political support to the former rebel movement (RENAMO), which now forms
the political opposition. Hence, high and rising regional inequality is not conducive to
peace.
Poverty reduction to peace (p→ p)
The links from aid to poverty reduction are similar in post-conflict economies to those
elsewhere, but the problems with those links may be more severe in countries that have
high levels of insecurity and weak institutions. However, pessimism for all post-conflict
countries is not warranted. If a country can build a reasonably stable post-war
government, then policy reform and growth may flow. In Uganda, sustained growth has
contributed to post-conflict stability by generating employment and per capita income
growth (Collier and Reinikka, 2001). Likewise, Mozambique, which started economic
reform well before the end of its civil war, has achieved sustained growth and
improvement in human development indicators, thereby contributing to peace, despite
the persistence of regional inequalities.
Poverty reduction can contribute to peace by reducing competition between com-
munities for resources, and may make it more difficult for demagogues to mobilise
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followers. Nevertheless, we should also recognise that the drive for wealth and power
motivates warlords—who may offer a young potential fighter more than he can ever
hope to gain as a smallholding farmer or urban worker. Therefore, when powerful
players remain on the stage, intent on grabbing power and wealth through war, we
should not overestimate the contribution of poverty reduction to peace. The inter-
national community needs to deploy effective force to contain spoilers and to reduce
their access to weapons, finance, and the markets for the spoils of war—natural
resources in particular.
Principle 5: In economic reform, focus on improving public
expenditure management and revenue mobilisation
Conflict has fiscal dimensions. Who gets what—via public spending—and who pays for
it—via taxes—may play a role in the descent into conflict.6 In turn, violent conflict leads
to further fiscal deterioration (Gupta et al., 2002). Revenues from indirect taxes fall as
economic activity shrinks, the quality of tax institutions declines, and governments
become ever more dependent on import duties and other trade taxes, which also decline
as external trade shrinks and as the quality and honesty of the customs service
deteriorates. The resulting fall in revenues reduces governments’ ability to fund develop-
ment expenditures and, in raising the fiscal deficit, it contributes to macroeconomic
instability. These all help to worsen poverty.
Whatever form the political settlement takes, it will have a fiscal dimension. People
will expect some new and often radically different distribution of services and infrastruc-
ture. This new pattern of public spending must be financed. Tax and revenue generation,
including some measure of political agreement on tax and revenue incidence, are
therefore central to the creation of a working peace agreement. However, post-conflict
finances are often ignored until it is too late.
Aid inflows can buy time for domestic political actors to reach a working agreement
and rebuild necessary revenue institutions. As the economy recovers, a broadening tax
base will provide some revenue buoyancy even under existing tax arrangements, and
revenue growth will accelerate as new tax arrangements and institutions come into
being. However, aid inflows to reconstructing economies can quickly tail off, and
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political actors will have trouble in the future if they neglect early attention to revenue
mobilisation.
Even if all parties are genuinely committed to peace, revenue institutions may be so
degraded that they cannot raise enough revenue. State capacity, including the public
expenditure system, may be so weak that it cannot use the revenues raised to deliver
improved infrastructure and services. Such degradation will also reduce a government’s
ability to use aid to redress grievances and achieve broad-based recovery (Addison and
Murshed, 2003). Further difficulties arise from the need in most countries for wholesale
fiscal reform. This often calls for a measure of fiscal federalism to reverse the over-cen-
tralisation of political and fiscal power (examples include Ethiopia and Bosnia-Herze-
govina). Territories that secede (Eritrea, Timor Leste) need to build national fiscal
institutions on the often-weak foundations of the local institutions imposed by previous
central or colonial authorities. This takes considerable time and investment, and
inevitably constrains revenue mobilisation in the early years.
For these reasons, we argue that the fiscal dimension of policy reform, and of aid
itself, is the most important dimension of the reform agenda for donors to focus on
(McGillivray and Morrissey, 2004). Donors often get distracted by less important
dimensions. For instance, there is an excessive concentration on market liberalisation
and privatisation, partly because these are much easier to implement than a sound
public expenditure and taxation system. Market liberalisation (if appropriate) or privati-
sation (when in the public interest and transparently conducted) are important to
growth and poverty reduction, but less important than fiscal management. For, in
addition to its development dimension, fiscal management has a crucial role to play in
strengthening governance and democratisation. Societies cannot build peace without
transparent public accounting, effective use of natural resource wealth for public
spending, and strong institutions that mobilise public revenues for clear development
purposes. Donors should focus on in their financial and technical assistance to govern-
ments these tasks.
Conclusion
To be effective, the efforts of donors and national actors (governments, the private
sector, and communities) must be supported by vigorous action to achieve security for
developing countries. Too many ‘post-conflict’ countries are characterised by high levels
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of insecurity and violence. As we have argued, such insecurity lowers the return on
donor projects and distorts domestic actors’ incentives. High insecurity forces political
actors to concentrate on short-term political survival, often thereby compromising
action on broad-based, poverty-reducing recovery. Aid is then less effective because the
necessary policy reforms, particularly of public expenditure management and revenue
mobilisation, happen late or not at all. Moreover, high insecurity holds back long-term
investment in the productive side of the economy, thereby constraining economic
growth and the ability to earn foreign exchange. Consequently, countries remain highly
aid-dependent.
Aid, therefore, needs to operate within a global security framework that rapidly
deploys peacekeeping forces of sufficient quality and size to achieve the goals given to
the UN by its peacekeeping mandate. This framework must be backed by action to tackle
the global flow of weapons and the resources used to finance the destruction of states
and societies. Finally, aid must be deployed within the context of a global trade
environment that supports the efforts of developing countries to take advantage of
opportunities offered by the world economy. Rich-country protectionism works against
the security agenda of poor countries by holding back their growth and ability to
generate resources for poverty reduction. In this way, it undermines aid effectiveness and
the security agenda of the rich countries themselves.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to workshop participants for useful comments, especially those
from Paul Isenman and David Roodman. The authors are also grateful to Robert
Picciotto for asking them to write this paper and providing comments on an early
summary of it. The usual disclaimer applies.
Endnotes
1. They include Svensson, 1999; Hansen and Tarp, 2000a,
2000b; Lensink and Morrissey, 2000; Collier and Dehn,
2001; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Gounder, (2001,
2002; Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Hudson and
Mosley, 2001; Lensink and White, 2001; Lu and Ram,
2001; Dalgaard et al., 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002;
Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2002; Gomanee et al., 2002,
2003; Mavrotas, 2002; Easterly et al., 2003; and Rood-
man, 2003. See Robinson and Tarp, 2000; Beynon,
2001, 2002; and McGillivray, 2003a, 2003b for reviews
of much of this literature.
2. Roodman takes Collier and Dehn (2001), Guillaumont
and Chauvet (2001), and Burnside and Dollar (1997,
2000) to task, arguing that their econometric results are
not robust. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) have not yet
been subjected to such a critique. Aid does not appear
alone as an explanatory variable in their model, and it
would be useful to test the robustness of their estimates
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
1:
42
 6
 A
ug
us
t 
20
10
Aid to conflict-affected countries 365
Burnside, C. & Dollar, D. 2000. Aid, Policies, and Growth.
American Economic Review 90(4) 847–68.
Cassen, R. 1994. Does Aid Work? Report to an Intergovern-
mental Task Force. Second edition. Oxford University
Press, New York.
Chauvet, L. & Guillaumont, P. 2002. Aid and Growth
Revisited: Policy, Economic Vulnerability and Political
Instability. Paper presented at the Annual Bank Confer-
ence on Development Economics: Towards Pro-poor
Policies (June), Oslo.
Collier, P. & Dehn, J. 2001. Aid, Shocks, and Growth, World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2688. World
Bank, Washington DC.
Collier, P. & Dollar, D. 2001. Can the World Cut Poverty in
Half? How Policy Reform and Effective Aid Can Meet
International Development Goals. World Development
29(11) 1787–802.
Collier, P. & Dollar, D. Aid Allocation and Poverty Re-
duction, European Economic Review 26 1475–500.
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. 2002. Aid, Policy, and Growth in
Post-Conflict Societies. Policy Research Working Paper
No. 2902. World Bank, Washington DC.
Collier, P. & Reinikka, R. 2001. Reconstruction and Liberal-
ization: an Overview, in Collier, P. & Reinikka, R.
(eds), Uganda’s Recovery: the Role of Farms, Firms, and
Government. World Bank, Washington DC.
Dalgaard, C. & Hansen, H. 2001. On Aid, Growth and Good
Policies. Journal of Development Studies 37(6) 17–35.
Dalgaard, C., Hansen, H. & Tarp, F. 2002. On the Empirics
of Foreign Aid and Growth, CREDIT Research Paper.
Centre for Research in Economic Development and
International Trade, University of Nottingham, Not-
tingham.
Demekas, D., James, G., McHugh, E. & Kosma, T. 2002. The
Economics of Post-conflict Aid. Working Paper No.
02/198. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
De Sousa, C. 2003. Rebuilding Rural Livelihoods and Social
Capital in Mozambique, in Addison, T. (ed.), From
Conflict to Recovery in Africa. Oxford University Press
for United Nations University/World Institute for De-
velopment Economics Research, Oxford.
de Sousa, A. M., Addison, T., Ekman, B. & Stenman, A˚.
2003. From Humanitarian Assistance to Poverty Re-
duction in Angola, in Addison, T. (ed.), From Conflict
to Recovery in Africa. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Easterly, W., Levine, R. & Roodman, D. 2003. New Data,
New Doubts: Revisiting ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’.
CGD Working Paper No. 26. Centre for Global Devel-
opment, Washington DC.
Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M. & Wallensteen, P. 2003. Pat-
terns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1990–2002. In SIPRI
Yearbook 2003. Oxford University Press for the Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford.
by including this term. As they stand, though, the
Collier–Hoeffler results do seem quite robust, and the
model from which they have been obtained has quite a
sound theoretical base. This is not to say that more
empirical validation of the impact of aid in post-
conflict scenarios is not required.
3. This number has been calculated using data obtained
from OECD (2003b) and the country classifications in
Collier and Hoeffler (2002).
4. This is not to imply that the general trend in aid away
from project support towards budgetary support is
unwelcome. It is to say, though, that such an approach,
which requires well functioning institutions and (poss-
ibly) good policy regimes, is inappropriate for some
countries.
5. Here we use the concept of tradability in its macroeco-
nomic sense, not in the sense of whether the good is
sold in a market or not.
6. See, for example, Ndikumana (2001) on Burundi and
Rwanda.
References
Addison, T. 2000. Aid and Conflict, in Tarp, F. (ed.), Foreign
Aid and Development. Routledge, London.
Addison, T. 2003. Africa’s Recovery from Conflict: Making
Peace Work for the Poor, Policy Brief 6, United Nations
University/World Institute for Development Economics
Research, Helsinki. Online at www.wider.unu.edu
Addison, T. & Murshed, S. M. 2002. Credibility and Repu-
tation in Peacemaking. Journal of Peace Research 39(4)
487–501.
Addison, T., Geda, A., Le Billon, P. and Murshed, S. M.
forthcoming. Reconstructing and Reforming the Finan-
cial System in Post-Conflict Countries. Journal of De-
velopment Studies.
Addison, T., Geda, A., Le Billon, P. and Murshed, S. M.
2003. Debt Relief and Civil War. Journal of Peace
Research 40(2) 159–76.
Beynon, J. 2001. Policy Implications for Aid Allocations of
Recent Research on Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity.
Paper Presented at the Joint Development Centre/DAC
Experts’ Seminar on Aid Effectiveness, Selectivity and
Poor Performers (January). OECD, Paris.
Beynon, J. 2002. Policy Implications for Aid Allocations of
Recent Research on Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity, in
Arvin, B. M. (ed.), New Perspectives on Foreign Aid and
Economic Development. CT: Praeger, Westport.
Burnside, C. & Dollar, D. 1997. Aid, Policies, and Growth.
Policy Research Working Paper 1777. World Bank,
Washington DC.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
1:
42
 6
 A
ug
us
t 
20
10
366 Tony Addison and Mark McGillivray
DAC Journal 4(3) 23–36.
McGillivray, M. 2003b. Aid, Growth, and Selectivity: To-
wards a Consensus. Paper presented at the Develop-
ment Studies Association (Economics, Finance and
Development Study Group) Conference on 50 Years of
Development Economics: Taking Stock of Controver-
sies (July). Overseas Development Institute, London.
McGillivray, M. & Morrissey, O. 2004. Fiscal Effects of Aid,
in Addison, T. & Roe, A. (eds), Fiscal Policy for Devel-
opment: Poverty, Reconstruction and Growth. Palgrave
Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Morrissey, O. Aid Effectiveness for Growth and Develop-
ment, ODI Opinions, February 2002.
Mosley, P. 1997. Overseas Aid: Its Defence and Reform.
Wheatsheaf, Brighton.
Ndikumana, L. 2001. Fiscal Policy, Conflict, and Recon-
struction in Burundi and Rwanda, World Institute for
Development Economics Research Discussion Paper 2001/
62. Online at www.wider.unu.edu
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) 2002. Geographical Distribution of Financial
Flows to Developing Countries. OECD, Paris:
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) 2003a. Mapping ODA Commitments to the
Millennium Development Goals, Development Coop-
eration Directorate Working Party on Statistics. June.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) 2003b. International Development Statistics
Online. Development Assistance Committee. Online at
www.oecd.org/dac
Picciotto, R. 2004. Towards a Comprehensive Security and
Development Framework. Paper presented at the Glo-
bal Policy Project Workshop on Security and Develop-
ment, Global Development Network, New Delhi 25–26
January.
Robinson, S. & Tarp, F. 2000. Foreign Aid and Develop-
ment: Summary and Synthesis, in Tarp, F. &
Hjertholm, P. (eds), Foreign Aid and Development:
Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future. Routledge,
New York and London.
Roodman, D. 2003. The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Devel-
opment, and Cross-country Empirics, Centre for Glo-
bal Development Working Paper No. 32. Centre for
Global Development, Washington, DC.
Stewart, F. 2001. Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Di-
mension of Development. World Institute for Develop-
ment Economics Research Annual Lecture 5.
UNU-WIDER, Helsinki. Online at www.wider.unu.edu
Svensson, J. 1999. Aid, Growth and Democracy. Economics
and Politics 11(3) 275–97.
Tirole, J. 1992. Persistence of Corruption, Institute of Policy
Reform Working Paper 55. Institute of Policy Reform,
Washington, DC.
Gates, S. 2001. Recruitment and Allegiances: The Micro-
foundation of Rebellion. Journal of Conflict Resolution
46 111–30.
Gomanee, K., Girma, S. & Morrissey, O. 2002. Aid and
Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Accounting for Trans-
mission Mechanisms, CREDIT Research Paper 02/05,
Centre for Research in Economic Development and
International Trade, University of Nottingham, Not-
tingham.
Gomanee, K., Girma, S. & Morrissey, O. 2003. Searching for
Aid Threshold Effects: Aid, Growth and the Welfare of
the Poor. University of Nottingham, mimeo, Notting-
ham.
Gomanee, K., Morrissey, O., Mosley, P. & Verschoor, A.
2002. Aid, Pro-poor Government Expenditure and
Welfare, University of Nottingham, mimeo, Notting-
ham.
Gounder, R. 2001, Aid-Growth Nexus: Empirical Evidence
from Fiji. Applied Economics 33 1009–19.
Gounder, R. 2002. Empirical Evidence of the Relationship
between Foreign Aid and Economic Growth: The Case
of the Solomon Islands, in Arvin, B. M. (ed.), New
Perspectives on Foreign Aid and Economic Development.
Praeger, Westport, CT.
Gupta, S., Clements, B., Bhattacharya, R. & Chakravarti, S.
2002. Fiscal Dimensions of Armed Conflict in Low-
and Middle-income Countries. International Monetary
Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department, Washington, DC.
Guillaumont, P. & Chauvet, L. 2001. Aid and Performance:
A Reassessment. Journal of Development Studies 37(6)
66–87.
Hansen, H. & Tarp, F. 2000a. Aid Effectiveness Disputed.
Journal of International Development 12 375–98.
Hansen, H. & Tarp, F. 2000b. Aid and Growth Regressions.
Journal of Development Economics 64 547–70.
Hudson, J. & Mosley, P. 2001. Aid, Policies, and Growth: In
Search of the Holy Grail. Journal of International Devel-
opment 13 1023–38.
Lensink, R. & Morrissey, O. 2000. Aid Instability as a
Measure of Uncertainty and the Positive Impact of Aid
on Growth. Journal of Development Studies 36(3) 31–
49.
Lensink, R. & White, H. 2001. Are There Negative Returns
to Aid? Journal of Development Studies 37(6) 42–64.
Lu, S. & Ram, R. 2001. Foreign Aid, Government Policies,
and Economic Growth: Further Evidence from Cross-
country Panel Data for 1970 to 1993. International
Economics 54 15–29.
Mavrotas, G. 2002. Aid and Growth in India: Some Evidence
from Disaggregated Aid Data. South Asia Economic
Journal 3(1) 19–49.
McGillivray, M. 2003a. Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity:
Integrating Multiple Objectives into Aid Allocations.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
1:
42
 6
 A
ug
us
t 
20
10
Aid to conflict-affected countries 367
Wuyts, M. 2003. The Agrarian Question in Mozambique’s
Transition and Reconstruction, in Addison, T. (ed.),
From Conflict to Recovery in Africa. Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Van der Hoeven, R. & Shorrocks, A. (eds), 2003. Perspectives
on Growth and Poverty. United Nations University
Press for United Nations University/World Institute for
Development Economics Research, Tokyo.
World Bank. 1998. Assessing Aid: What Works, What
Doesn’t, and Why? Oxford University Press, New York.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
1:
42
 6
 A
ug
us
t 
20
10
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
1:
42
 6
 A
ug
us
t 
20
10
